The Limits of Commitment

Jacopo Bizzotto, Toomas Hinnosaar and Adrien Vigier
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Adrien Vigier: University of Oxford

Working Papers from Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School

Abstract: We study partial commitment in leader-follower games. A collection of subsets covering the leader's action space determines her commitment opportunities. We characterize the outcomes resulting from all possible commitment structures of this kind. If the commitment structure is an interval partition, then the leader's payoff is bounded by the payoffs she obtains under the full and no-commitment benchmarks. We apply our results to study new design problems.

Date: 2022-05-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oml:wpaper:202206

DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2205.05546

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