CARTELS – BETWEEN THEORY, LENIENCY POLICY AND FINES
Mihai Berinde
Annals of Faculty of Economics, 2008, vol. 1, issue 1, 549-552
Abstract:
Among the anti-competitive practices sanctioned by competition law, cartel is the most harmful to the competitive environment. Cartel participation is sanctioned both by national and community legislation with large fines, which can reach up to 10% of the turnover of the companies involved. In order to facilitate the detection of cartels, which are, by definition, secret agreements, instructions promoting a leniency program were elaborated at European Commission level, encouraging the participants to provide information regarding the existence of a cartel. It is expected that the large fines applied in cartel cases will increase the attractiveness of the leniency program and, implicitly, to the detection of an even greater number of such practices.
Keywords: cartel; leniency; fine (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F10 N73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ora:journl:v:1:y:2008:i:1:p:549-552
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