Unintended Consequences: Reconsidering the Effects of UN Peacekeeping on State-sponsored Violence

William George Nomikos

No 8h6fs, OSF Preprints from Center for Open Science

Abstract: This essay challenges theoretical and empirical arguments about peacebuilding effectiveness that put the state at the center of United Nations peace operations. We argue that state-centric UN peacebuilding operations inadvertently incentivize local-level violence in post-conflict zones. We demonstrate that when the UN supports central governments it unintentionally empowers non-professionalized militaries, paramilitaries, and warlords to settle local scores. Armed violence against civilians in turn triggers a vicious cycle of reprisals and counter-reprisals. As an alternative to state-centric peacebuilding operations that incentivize local violence, we suggest that the UN should shift strategic resources away from central governments and toward UN policing, support of traditional and religious authorities, and the training of local security institutions.

Date: 2021-08-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-isf
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:osfxxx:8h6fs

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/8h6fs

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