The Guardian State: Strengthening the Public Service against Democratic Backsliding

Kutsal Yesilkagit, Michael Bauer, B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre

No nkqa8, OSF Preprints from Center for Open Science

Abstract: This article addresses the vulnerability of liberal democracy to illiberal political movements and the gradual erosion of democratic institutions. While free and fair elections are central to democracy, backsliding politicians can exploit them to legitimate their undemocratic actions. To safeguard liberal democracy, we propose the concept of the Guardian State, which embraces liberal principles while acting as a defensive barrier against illiberal tendencies. This requires strong administrative institutions, i.e., an empowered civil service that upholds liberal democratic norms and resists pressures from populist politicians. Institutionalizing guardianship as the key norm within the civil service fortifies democratic institutions against backsliding. It acknowledges the challenges posed by the principle of neutrality, which cannot ensure that only liberal citizens come to power. Structural measures at the individual and organizational levels are essential to fortify the foundations of the Guardian State and protect liberal democracy against evolving threats. We conclude that proactive efforts are necessary to defend and strengthen the public service to ensure the long-term viability of democratic governance. The Guardian State, then, rooted in liberal democratic values, provides a framework for protecting against illiberal and authoritarian forces, and places the bureaucracy in a key role in preserving the core principles of democracy.

Date: 2024-01-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:osfxxx:nkqa8

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/nkqa8

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