Recognizing Local Leaders as an Anti-Corruption Strategy: Experimental and Ethnographic Evidence from Uganda

Mark T Buntaine, Alex Bagabo, Tanner Bangerter, Paul Bukuluki and Brigham Daniels

No x86q3, OSF Preprints from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Conventional anti-corruption approaches focus on detecting and punishing the misuse of public office. Recognizing that these approaches are often ineffective in settings where social norms do not support reporting on and punishing corruption, we implemented a field experiment in Uganda that offered elected, local leaders the chance to earn positive, public recognition for overseeing development projects according to legal guidelines. We then conducted a second field experiment that informed other leaders and members of the public about the award winners. Offering leaders the chance to earn recognition did not improve the management of public projects or change leaders' norms about corruption. Informing other leaders and residents about the award winners also did not change behaviors or attitudes related to corruption. A paired ethnographic study shows that the possibility for recognition generated excitement, but was not able to overcome constraints on local leaders' ability to manage public projects. Our study provides some of the first experimental evidence about using non-financial incentives to improve the performance of public officials. The results imply that non-financial incentives are at best complementary to systemic changes in public financial management, particularly in settings with pervasive corruption and governance challenges.

Date: 2022-10-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-exp and nep-ppm
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:osfxxx:x86q3

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/x86q3

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