 Redistribution and Social Information (ReSoc)Tanya O'Garra and Matthew R. Sisco No 28xwv, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science Abstract: We use a ‘multi-player dictator game’ (MDG) to examine how aggregate and individual redistribution behaviour is influenced by the observable actions of peers, and to identify whether the redistributive strategy selected by individuals is subject to an ‘anchoring effect’. We find that in the aggregate, individuals positively condition their redistribution choices on the contributions of first-movers in their group, suggesting conformity to peers. However, examination of second-mover ‘types’ (classified using the full vector of individual contributions stated in response to a range of first-mover donations) indicates that only 17% can be classed as ‘conformists’; the remaining major 'types' include self-interested players (42%), unconditional givers (22%) and ‘compensators’ (8.3%). Most strikingly, the first observable amount presented to second-movers in the strategy game (the anchor) is found to influence the likelihood of choosing a giving strategy versus a self-interested strategy. Specifically, low anchors increase the likelihood of selecting self-interested strategies, whilst high anchors increase the likelihood of conformist and compensating strategies. The distribution of ‘types’ is therefore dependent on the initial conditions of play in the strategy game. Thus, not only is individual redistribution behaviour observed to be path dependent, but initial conditions strongly determine the path. Date: 2018-06-22 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:28xwv Access Statistics for this paper More papers in SocArXiv from Center for Open Science |
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