Pathways to Prosocial Leadership: An Online Experiment on the Effects of External Subsidies and the Relative Price of Giving
Blaine G Robbins,
Daniel Karell,
Simon Siegenthaler and
Aaron Kamm
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Blaine G Robbins: New York University Abu Dhabi
No 3umys, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science
Abstract:
Leaders are a part of virtually every group and organization, and while they help solve the various collective action problems that groups face, they can also be unprincipled and incompetent, pursuing their own interests over those of the group. What types of circumstances foster prosocial leadership and motivate leaders to pursue group interests? In a modified dictator game (N = 798), we examine the effects of piece-rate subsidies (or pay per unit of work performed) and the relative price of giving (or the size of the benefit to others for giving) on prosocial behavior and norms about giving. We find that subsidies increase giving by leaders, that the relative price of giving is unrelated to prosocial behavior, and that neither affects norms about giving. Furthermore, the introduction and removal of a subsidy does not undermine giving over time. Our results imply that subsidies increase group welfare by motivating leaders to allocate a larger share of resources to group members.
Date: 2023-11-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Working Paper: Pathways to Prosocial Leadership: An Online Experiment on the Effects of External Subsidies and the Relative Price of Giving (2023) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:3umys
DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/3umys
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