Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Battle for Credit

Emiel Awad, Varun Karekurve-Ramachandra and Lawrence Rothenberg

No ajrey, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: How does blaming and crediting affect the implementation of policies and what are the constraints that reputation-concerned politicians face in commenting about bureaucrats? On one hand, politicians may want to claim credit when things go well and deflect blame when outcomes go awry. On the other, the distribution of blame and credit not only affects the politicians' reputation but also those of bureaucratic agencies and potentially their willingness to work over time. To investigate this tension, we develop and analyze a model where a bureaucrat cares about his reputation vis-a-vis an interested audience, and the politician can blame the bureaucrat for failed policies or give credit for successes via cheap talk. We show that the bureaucrat can be induced to exert more effort through blame and credit, but that the politician is constrained in communication by considerations for future effort and her own reputation concerns.

Date: 2023-04-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:ajrey

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/ajrey

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