The Politics of Correctional Privatization in the United States

Brett Burkhardt
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Brett Burkhardt: Oregon State University

No dfex5, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Research Summary: Private correctional firms are political actors. They work to create favorable conditions to market their services. At the same time, they are constrained by external political forces, including political parties, social movements, and public opinion. This article reviews what we know about the reciprocal relationship between the private corrections industry and politics. Policy Implications: The review of extant research yields several implications for practitioners and policymakers. First, correctional privatization is not uniformly accepted, a fact that presents challenges for the industry and opportunities for critics. Second, punitive policies that appear beneficial to industry (particularly, those related to tough immigration policy) may in fact pose real reputational risks. Third, new forms of privatization—namely, social impact bonds—may prove more tolerable to the general public. Finally, consideration of political activity by private industry should not distract from political activity by public sector actors (e.g., prison guard unions).

Date: 2019-09-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:dfex5

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/dfex5

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