Great powers in global tax governance: a comparison of the US role in the CRS and BEPS

Wouter Lips

No ewd3j, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: The G20 and the OECD recently claimed two successes in global tax governance: adopting automatic exchange of banking information in 2014, and the 2015 BEPS project on taxation of multinational companies. While the former signifies an essential step forward in reducing tax evasion, the BEPS outcomes were criticized for merely patching up flawed taxation principles based on the arms’-length standard. The emergence of global automatic exchange of information is often ascribed to the US who unilaterally enforced its own FATCA automatic information-exchange standard, while no comparable action happened during BEPS. This article investigates the US position on the BEPS outcomes and if a similar unilateral action would have led to more far-reaching cooperation concerning BEPS. By examining the distributional consequences of cooperation in both processes, we conclude that US power in tax governance in both issues is more limited than generally assumed and insufficient to explain global cooperation.

Date: 2018-05-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:ewd3j

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/ewd3j

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