Segment and Rule: Modern Censorship in Authoritarian Regimes

Kun Heo and Antoine Zerbini

No np2j8, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: The internet provides citizens with a large range of foreign outlets to choose from. To discourage access to foreign outlets, authoritarian regimes appear to rely primarily on the firewall, which millions bypass everyday. Crucially, in equilibrium, the regime ensures that only a specific segment of the population self-selects into bypassing the firewall: regime opponents. In turn, opponents are occasionally swayed to comply by positive reporting about the regime of banned foreign outlets. Supporters exclusively consume content from domestic outlets; their compliance is secured via the regime propaganda. We label such a strategy one of segment-and-rule and show how it maximizes compliance. We also explain how authoritarian regimes can engineer segment-and-rule by making local outlets parrot the party line, investing in domestic entertainment or strategically banning foreign entertainment.

Date: 2023-09-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:np2j8

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/np2j8

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