History of and Aftermath from the Withdrawal of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

Aaron Berliner, Jake Hecla, Michael Bondin, Austin Mullen, Kelsey Amundson, Elena Osorio Camacena, Alex Droster, Dinara Ermakova, Tyler Scott Nagel and Nicole L. Nappi

No nur9v, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: On February 1, 2019, the United States and Russia withdrew from the three-decades old Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. Events precipitating the withdrawal were allegations by both the United States and Russia of a variety of treaty violations. Until that point, the treaty had been a centerpiece of arms control and a key agreement of the global security architecture. The absence of such a pillar has the potential destabilize the status quo of arms control, creating significant uncertainty in global nuclear stability and security. In this paper, we present a historical review as overture to an analysis on the impacts of this development on force structure. This analysis examines the changes in U.S., Russian, and Chinese nuclear forces which may occur as a result of the treaty's demise. The article concludes with commentary on potential actions to preserve stability in a post-INF world.

Date: 2020-12-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis and nep-his
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:nur9v

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/nur9v

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