Dark Money and Voter Learning

Keith Schnakenberg, Collin Schumock and Ian R Turner
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Ian R Turner: Yale University

No r562d, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: We provide a model of dark money in elections. An ideologically extreme donor with private information about candidate ideology and quality can advertise on behalf of a candidate. Advertising reveals information about candidate quality to voters, who can learn from either donor-funded or neutral advertising. Voters update negatively about candidate ideology when ads are known to be donor-funded. Dark money suppresses source information and allows donors to advertise candidate quality while simultaneously concealing the ideological motivations behind ad funding. However, dark money leads voters to become skeptical of all advertising, which can disadvantage donors.

Date: 2023-01-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:r562d

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/r562d

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