The Politics of Platform Capitalism. A Case Study on the Regulation of Uber in New York

Timo Seidl

No up9qz, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Platform companies like Uber not only disrupt existing markets but also contest existing regulatory regimes. This raises the question of how, when, and why such companies are regulated. This paper develops, tests and defends a theoretical framework that explains the politics of regulatory response to the rise of platform capitalism. Using discourse network analysis and a case study on the regulation of Uber in New York, it shows that the success or failure of regulations depends on the ability of actors to mobilize broad coalition; that narratives affect the composition of these coalitions; and that platform companies have both unique political strengths and vulnerabilities. The paper makes substantive contributions to our understanding of the politics of platform capitalism, and it makes theoretical contributions to the literatures on coalitional politics, ideational institutionalism, and business power.

Date: 2020-04-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gen, nep-pay, nep-pol and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:up9qz

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/up9qz

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