Does bargaining power impact the citizen's willingness to report corruption? An experimental study of harassment bribery

Anna Shcherbiak

No sj694, Thesis Commons from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Using a lab-in-the-field experiment, I examine whether higher bargaining power increases citizens’ willingness to report instances of bribe solicitation. Previous research suggested that access to higher initial endowment reduces the relative cost of reporting, which, in turn, signals a threat of punishment to the corrupt officials deterring them from engagement. While I do not find evidence for the effectiveness of higher bargaining power in deterring bribes, there is a significant negative relationship between the citizen’s endowment level and their willingness to report. Results reveal that highly endowed individuals are less likely to spend their resources to exert bottom-up pressure on corrupt officials, thereby failing to hold them accountable.

Date: 2022-05-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-mfd
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:thesis:sj694

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/sj694

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