Dynamic Analysis of Innovation and Licensing: The Effects of Intellectual Property Rights Protection

Hitoshi Tanaka (), Tatsuro Iwaisako and Koichi Futagami
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Hitoshi Tanaka: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University

No 06-06, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: Licensing is one of the major sources of international technology transfer to developing countries. This paper clarifies how strengthening intellectual property rights (IPRs) affect innovation and licensing by making use of a quality-ladder type of dynamic general equilibrium model. We explore not only the long-run effects but also the short-run effects of the policy by fully examining the dynamic characteristics of the model. The model shows that stronger IPRs promote innovation and technology transfers in both the long run and the short run if IPR protection greatly reduces the negotiation cost of licensing.

Keywords: Licensing; Innovation; Intellectual property rights; North-South; Technology transfer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F43 O33 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2006-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:0606

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