Social Recognition and Economic Equilibrium

Ken Urai ()
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Ken Urai: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University

No 06-29, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: This paper is an attempt to incorporate the human ability of recognition, especially, the ability to recognize the society to which they belong, with the economic equilibrium theory characterized by a description of society through individual rational behaviors. Contents may be classi ed into the following three categories: (1) a rigorous set theoretical treatment of the description of individual rationality; (2) set theoretical description of the validity in a society; and (3) rationality as an equilibrium ( xed point) of social recognition.

Keywords: Social Recognition; Rationality; Social Equilibrium; Fixed Point Theorem; Godel's Incompleteness Theorem. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A10 B40 C60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2006-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-sea
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:0628

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