Detecting Collusion through Exchange of Favors in Repeated Procurement Auctions

Rieko Ishii

No 07-15, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: It is known that bid rigging in public-work auctions in Japan often takes the form of exchanging favors. In such a scheme, the winner is designated based on the amount of favor he has given to other members of the ring. By explicitly modeling gfavor h as an explanatory variable, this paper analyzes data from the public-works auctions for consulting works in Naha, Japan, to confirm that such a collusion scheme is in operation.

Keywords: Bid rigging; repeated auction. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 H57 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2007-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:0715

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