Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Rule in Queueing Problems: A Relationship between Equity and Efficiency

Kazuhiko Hashimoto () and Hiroki Saitoh ()
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Kazuhiko Hashimoto: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
Hiroki Saitoh: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

No 08-17, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we consider a relationship between equity and efficiency in queueing problems. We show that under strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare implies queue-efficiency. Furthermore, we also give a characterization of the equally distributed pairwise pivotal rule, as the only rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare and budget-balance.

Keywords: Queueing Problems; Strategy-Proofness; Anonymity in welfare; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2008-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse and nep-gth
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