Exclusionary Vertical Contracts with Multiple Entrants

Hiroshi Kitamura ()
Additional contact information
Hiroshi Kitamura: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University

No 08-39, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: This paper constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive dealing in the presence of multiple entrants. Unlike a single-entrant model in the extant literature, an entrant competes not only with the incumbent to deal with buyers but also with other entrants. The competition among entrants then plays the role of commitment such that low wholesale prices are offered to buyers when they deviate from exclusive contracts. We argue that this commitment effect becomes a barrier to exclusive dealing and that the results differ drastically from the predictions of the single-entrant framework.

Keywords: Vertical Relation; Exclusive Dealing; Multiple Entrants; Antitrust Policy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L12 L41 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2008-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/0839.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:0839

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The Economic Society of Osaka University ().