Managerial Entrenchment, Banker Distribution, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Japan

Takanori Tanaka ()
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Takanori Tanaka: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

No 09-02, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates whether managerial entrenchment of controlling shareholders affects the distribution of bankers to the boards of Japanese manufacturing firms. Bankers are not likely to be appointed to firms with large corporate shareholders as controlling shareholders because large corporate shareholders have incentives to entrench managers. Moreover, in the aftermath of executive appointments of banks and large corporate shareholders, restructuring and improved performances of the appointing firms are facilitated. The results suggest that managerial entrenchment of large corporate shareholders generates the substitution of role of corporate governance between banks and large corporate shareholders.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Managerial entrenchment; Controlling shareholders; Banks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 G21 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2009-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:0902

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