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Inflation Inertia and Optimal Delegation of Monetary Policy

Keiichi Morimoto ()

No 09-05, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes the relationship between the optimal weight on output gap in the central bank fs loss function and the degree of inertia in a hybrid version of New Keynesian model with a pure discretionary inflation targeting. I present the policy recommendations as to the weight on output gap in the presence of endogenous persistence in inflation dynamics. Especially, I show that under endogenous persistence of inflation dynamics, even in discretionary monetary policy regime, a Rogoff fs (1985) conservative central banker does not necessarily improve social welfare.

Keywords: hybrid New Keynesian model; inflation targeting; policy weight (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2009-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
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http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/0905.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Inflation inertia and optimal delegation of monetary policy (2011) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:0905

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