Endogenous Policy Announcement and Accountability for Inflation Target

Keiichi Morimoto ()

No 09-06, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, I show that accountability for inflation target will improve social welfare when the central bank makes transparency-opaqueness choices endogenously. The key elements are uncertainty of the firms f informational quality, the opacity bias of constrained discretionay monetary policy under noisy information, and the role of harmful noisy public information. Based on the qualitative and quantitative result, I present a policy recommendation as to policy announcements and inflation targeting regime.

Keywords: asymmetric information; economic transparency; inflation targeting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2009-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:0906

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