Managerial Entrenchment and Corporate Bond Financing: Evidence from Japan

Takanori Tanaka ()
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Takanori Tanaka: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University

No 09-10, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates whether managerial entrenchment of controlling shareholders affects corporate bond financing. Using data on Japanese manufacturing firms, we find that firms with controlling shareholders issue less straight corporate bonds than other firms. The results show that managerial entrenchment of controlling shareholders has an influential impact on corporate bond financing.

Keywords: Managerial entrenchment; Large corporate shareholders; Corporate bonds (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2009-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-cfn
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