Optimal Structure of Monetary Policy Committees

Keiichi Morimoto ()

No 09-36, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: This paper explores an optimal personnel organization problem of monetary policy committees. First, I construct an analytically tractable model for monetary policy analysis which starts from decision-making in the monetary policy committee. Using the model, I investigate the relationship between preference heterogeneity among the committee members and the optimal structure of the monetary policy committee. The result shows that it is optimal in general cases to appoint not only inflation-minded (hawkish) persons but also output-minded (dovish) persons. This is a justification for the fact that the actual monetary policy committees (e.g. MPC of Bank of England and FOMC) usually consist of both type members as the empirical researches suggest.

Keywords: monetary policy; committee; delegation; imperfect information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D84 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2009-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-mon
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Optimal Structure of Monetary Policy Committees (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:0936

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