Coordination Behavior and Optimal Committee Size

Keiichi Morimoto (keiichi.morimoto@meisei-u.ac.jp)

No 10-02, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: How many members should committees consist of? This paper addresses this question in view of imperfect information and coordination behavior among the members, which is a new approach alternative to introducing information acquisition cost. First, using a simple model, I show that the existence of the coordination motive dismisses Condorcet fs (1785) suggestion and the finite optimal size of the committee is determined. Second, I provide an application of the mechanism to monetary policy committees in a basic New Keynesian model. This example will inspire other applications to policy issues in the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework.

Keywords: committee; Condorcet jury theorem; coordination; higher order beliefs monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D84 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2010-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:1002

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