Welfare effects of patent protection and productive public services: why do developing countries prefer weaker patent protection?

Tatsuro Iwaisako

No 12-19, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the welfare-maximizing degree of patent protection in a growth model where the engines of economic growth are R&D and public services. We find that an increase in public services enhances the positive and negative effects of strengthening patent protection on R&D and the volume of production, respectively. However, if public services are relatively small, the negative welfare effect associated with the decrease in production volume tends to outweigh the positive welfare effect from the increase in the growth rate, and so the welfare-maximizing degree of patent protection tends to be lower. This result provides one possible explanation for why developing countries tend to prefer weaker patent protection.

Keywords: endogenous growth; patent protection; public services; welfare analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O34 O38 O40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2012-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fdg, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1219.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Welfare effects of patent protection and productive public services: Why do developing countries prefer weaker patent protection? (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:1219

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