Public Education and Social Security: A Political Economy Approach

Tetsuo Ono

No 13-06, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: This paper develops an overlapping-generations model with uncertain lifetimes and altruism towards children. The paper characterizes a Markov perfect political equilibrium of voting over two conflicting policy issues, public education for the young and social security for the elderly. The model derives multiple indeterminate political equilibria and demonstrates that the difference between the two equilibria in terms of policies and lifetime utility depends on longevity. In particular, the model prediction with respect to the differences in policies and longevity is consistent with the empirical evidence in developed countries.

Keywords: Public education; Social security; Intergenerational conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H52 H55 I22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2013-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-dge and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Public education and social security: a political economy approach (2015)
Working Paper: Public Education and Social Security: A Political Economy Approach (2014)
Working Paper: Public Education and Social Security: A Political Economy Approach (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:1306

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The Economic Society of Osaka University ().