Public Education and Social Security: A Political Economy Approach

Tetsuo Ono

No 13-06-Rev, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: This paper develops an overlapping-generations model with altruism towards children. The paper characterizes a Markov perfect political equilibrium of voting over two policy issues, public education for the young and social security for the old. The model potentially generates two types of political equilibria, and one of them is selected by the government from the viewpoint of maximizing its objective. The paper shows that (i) longevity affects equilibrium selection and relevant policy choices; and (ii) private education as an alternative to public education as well as the concept of Markov perfect political equilibrium are the keys to generate the two types of equilibria.

Keywords: Public education; Social security; Intergenerational conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H52 H55 I22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2013-05, Revised 2013-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dge and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Public education and social security: a political economy approach (2015)
Working Paper: Public Education and Social Security: A Political Economy Approach (2014)
Working Paper: Public Education and Social Security: A Political Economy Approach (2013)
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