Public Education and Social Security: A Political Economy Approach

Tetsuo Ono

No 13-06-Rev.2, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: This study presents an overlapping-generations model with altruism towards children. We characterize a Markov-perfect political equilibrium of voting over two policy issues, public education for the young and social security for the old. The model potentially generates two types of political equilibria, one favoring public education and the other favoring social security. One equilibrium is selected by the government to maximize its objective. It is shown that (i) longevity affects equilibrium selection and relevant policy choices; and (ii) private education as an alternative to public education and a Markov-perfect political equilibrium can gen- erate the two types of equilibria.

Keywords: Public education; Social security; Intergenerational conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H52 H55 I22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2013-09, Revised 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dge, nep-edu, nep-fdg and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Public education and social security: a political economy approach (2015)
Working Paper: Public Education and Social Security: A Political Economy Approach (2013)
Working Paper: Public Education and Social Security: A Political Economy Approach (2013)
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