Wealth Distribution Dynamics with Status Preference: asymmetric motivations for status

Yutaro Hatta ()
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Yutaro Hatta: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University

No 13-08, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: This paper explores the implications of status-seeking behavior in wealth for economic dynamics. I move away from the conventional setup of status preference. That is, individuals with higher wealth behave differently as compared to those with lower wealth; agents with different wealth have asymmetric motivations for social status: mathematically, there is a kink in status utility, which is empirically suggested. The main results are as follows: the stability of the equal steady state in an economy is determined by which agents have higher motivations for status. Depending on parameter values, whether inequality may diminish or persist is determined. Inequality and output are intricately related, due to asymmetric motivations.

Keywords: Status-seeking; Relative wealth; Wealth Distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D91 O40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2013-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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