General Equilibrium Model for an Asymmetric Information Economy

Ken Urai (), Akihiko Yoshimachi and Kohei Shiozawa ()
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Ken Urai: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
Akihiko Yoshimachi: Department of Commerce, Doshisha University
Kohei Shiozawa: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University

No 13-27, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: This paper fs main purpose is to introduce a new concept of the market fs commodity-information structure (a partition of the set of real goods that are treated as one commodity for market ex- changes) on which we base our ordinary static general equilibrium arguments and settings to analyze asymmetric information problems. We concentrate on the market viability problem that is concerned with describing such situations as adverse selection under informational asymmetry among agents as an equilibrium in general equilibrium frameworks. The market equilibrium-existence conditions, non-equilibrium-existence examples, and Pareto-optimal equilibrium-properties are studied.

Keywords: General Equilibrium Model; Asymmetric Information; Adverse Selection; Market Un- raveling; Market Viability Problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D51 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2013-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:1327

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