The Relationships between Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosures: Unobservable Precision Choices by Management

Toru Ishikawa ()
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Toru Ishikawa: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University

No 15-09, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of mandatory disclosure information on unobservable precision choices by management of voluntary disclosure. Prior research articles investigate the precision of information disclosed by management, but they do not consider the relationships between mandatory and voluntary disclosure information. In this paper, I focus on the relation- ships and analyze precision choices under the situation that there are manda- tory and voluntary disclosure. I find that mandatory disclosure information influences precision choices of voluntary disclosure.

Keywords: Mandatory Disclosure; Voluntary Disclosure; Unobservable; Preci- sion choice; Relationship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M41 M48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2015-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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