Local Independence, Monotonicity and Axiomatic Characterization of Price-Money Message Mechanism

Ken Urai () and Hiromi Murakami ()
Additional contact information
Ken Urai: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
Hiromi Murakami: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University

No 16-08, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: To characterize money in a static economic model, it is known to be important to consider the agent- commodity double-in nity settings, i.e., the overlapping-generations framework. There does not seem to exist any papers, however, treating the axiomatic characterization problems for such monetary Walras allocations under the social choice and/or mechanism design settings. We show that the monetary Walras allocation for the economy with double in nities is characterized by weak Pareto- optimality, individual rationality, local independence or the monotonicity conditions of social choice correspondence among the allocation mechanisms with messages under the category theoretic approach in Sonnenschein (1974). We utilize Sonnenschein's market extension axiom for swamped economies that is closely related to the replica stability axiom of Thomson (1988). We can see how these conditions characterize the price-money message mechanism universally among a wide class of mechanisms, and efficiently in the sense that it has the minimal message spaces (price-money dictionary theorems). Moreover, by using the category theoretic framework, we can obtain the up-to-isomorphism uniqueness for such a dictionary object (isomorphism theorems).

Keywords: Resource Allocation Mechanism; Social Choice Correspondence; Overlapping-Generations Economy; Monetary Walras Allocation; Local Independence; Monotonicity; Informational Efficiency; Universal Mapping Property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 D50 D51 D71 E00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2016-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1608.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:1608

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The Economic Society of Osaka University ().