 Capital Income Taxation, Economic Growth, and the Politics of Public EducationNo 18-05, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics Abstract: This study considers the politics of public education and its impacts on economic growth and welfare across generations. Public education is funded by taxing the labor income of the working generation and capital income of the retired. We employ probabilistic voting to demonstrate the politics of taxes and expenditure and show that aging results in a shift of the tax burden from the old to the young and a slowdown of economic growth. We then consider three alternative constraints that limit the choice of taxes and/or expenditure: a minimum level of public education expenditure, an upper limit of the capital income tax rate, and a combination of the two. These constraints all create a trade-off between current and future generations in terms of welfare. Keywords: Public education; Economic growth; Capital income tax; Political equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:1805 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC. |
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