Inequality aversion with general payoff function

Daijiro Kawanaka ()
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Daijiro Kawanaka: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University

No 21-09, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: In the existing axiomatic models of inequity aversion, players have linear payoff functions, so they can predict that a dictator chooses only a completely selfish or completely fair offer in dictator games. However, experimental literature documents that a significantly amount of dictators offers 20-30% of the total pie to the passive opponent. This note, in contrast, axiomatizes inequity averse representation with general payoff function, so that we can explain such interior choices.

Keywords: Inequality aversion under risk; Maxmin expected utility; Social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8pages
Date: 2021-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-ore and nep-upt
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