Successful and Dead-end Jobs in a Bureaucracy:Evidence from Japan

Kenta Kojima and Katsuya Takii
Additional contact information
Kenta Kojima: Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics, Kansai University

No 19E008, OSIPP Discussion Paper from Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University

Abstract: This paper develops a novel method that assigns a job a value to capture both the likelihood and speed of promotion from each job to a top executive and applies it to investigate the career paths of bureaucrats in Japan. We find that outwardly similar jobs within the same hierarchical rank, estimated using the standard method in Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994), have very different opportunities to be promoted to a top executive. We can also detect frequent real demotions and the presence of early selection (read fast track) of elite bureaucrats unable to be detected through use of hierarchical rank.

Keywords: Human Internal labor market; Career paths; Promotion; Fast track; Bureaucracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H83 J41 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2019-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/archives/DP/2019/DP2019E008.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osp:wpaper:19e008

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in OSIPP Discussion Paper from Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Akiko Murashita ().