Incentives in Experiments: A Theoretical Analysis

Paul Healy (), Yaron Azrieli and Christopher Chambers

No 16-03, Working Papers from Ohio State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Experimental economists currently lack a convention for how to pay subjects in experiments with multiple tasks. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing this question. Assuming monotonicity (dominated gambles are never chosen) and nothing else, we prove that paying for one randomly-chosen problem — the random problem selection (RPS) mechanism — is essentially the only incentive compatible mechanism. Paying for every period is similarly justified when we assume only a ‘no complementarities at the top’ (NCaT) condition. To help experimenters decide which is appropriate for their particular experiment, we also discuss empirical tests of these two assumptions.

Keywords: Experimental design; decision theory; mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D01 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 Pages
Date: 2016-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (54)

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Journal Article: Incentives in Experiments: A Theoretical Analysis (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osu:osuewp:16-03

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