Observable Actions

Ryosuke Ishii

ビジネス創造センターディスカッション・ペーパー (Discussion papers of the Center for Business Creation) from Otaru University of Commerce

Abstract: We consider a game with " meta-players" who observe each other's actions before actual play. The observability exerts an effect like repeated games without discounting. The game has Nash equilibria with any individually rational payoff profiles. In addition, the outcomes that satisfy a modified version of evolutionary stability lead to Pareto efficiency in coordination games.

Keywords: Metagame; Folk theorem; Evolutionarily stable set; Equilibrium selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2012-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe
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Published in Discussion paper series (2012), 145: 1-23

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ota:busdis:10252/4776

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