Delegation to a potentially uninformed agent

Aggey Semenov

No 1215E, Working Papers from University of Ottawa, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider a delegation problem with a biased and potentially uninformed agent when the principal cannot use monetary payments. If the bias between the principal and the agent is large then the optimal delegation set is an interval. When the bias is small or medium the optimal delegation set is no longer connected. It can be one of two types: 1) with an interval and low option, 2) with two intervals. In all cases the agent has less discretion. However, in the case of medium bias the principal delegates in a wider range than in the case of an informed agent

Keywords: energy; Information, bias, non-informed agent, delegation set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Delegation to potentially uninformed agent (2012)
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