DOES GOOGLE LEVERAGE MARKET POWER THROUGH TYING AND BUNDLING?

Benjamin Edelman

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2015, vol. 11, issue 2, 365-400

Abstract: I examine Google's pattern and practice of tying to leverage its dominance into new sectors. In particular, I show how Google used these tactics to enter numerous markets, to compel usage of its services, and often to dominate competing offerings. I explore the technical and commercial implementations of these practices and identify their effects on competition. I conclude that Google's tying tactics are suspect under antitrust law.

JEL-codes: K21 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:11:y:2015:i:2:p:365-400.

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Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

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