WHO COOPERATES IN STANDARDS CONSORTIA—RIVALS OR COMPLEMENTORS?

Justus Baron and Tim Pohlmann

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2013, vol. 9, issue 4, 905-929

Abstract: Formal standard development is increasingly supplemented by standards consortia: informal and less inclusive alliances, in which firms coordinate standard-related research and development (“R&D”) and streamline standard development. In order to cast light on the economic function of these consortia, this article provides empirical evidence on the standards related to informal consortia, and on the R&D contributions of members and outsiders. We find that standards related to consortia are characterized by a more fragmented ownership of intellectual property rights (“IPR”) and a strong degree of technological rivalry. We also find that among the firms contributing to a standard, technological specialists are less likely to be member of a consortium. Companies are more likely to be members of the same consortium with companies specializing in R&D that is substitutable rather than complementary to their own patent portfolio. One possible interpretation of these findings is that a main benefit of standards consortia is to reduce the cost of standard development by eliminating wasteful R&D duplication and settling conflicts of interest upfront to formal standardization.

JEL-codes: L14 O31 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:9:y:2013:i:4:p:905-929.

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Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

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