Compensation and its Limits: Can Trade’s Losers be Made Whole?
Kevin Kolben
Journal of International Economic Law, 2021, vol. 24, issue 4, 683-702
Abstract:
Free trade and global economic integration has been under pressure from populist political movements across the globe. Many of the critiques of trade relate to the losses, both economic and non-economic, that trade’s losers suffer. Many economists and trade lawyers consider the case for free trade to be unassailable and rely on the compensation principle to argue that trade is welfare maximizing if trade’s losers could be compensated such that each is as least as well off as they were before. As a corollary, they will argue that the losers of trade should be compensated for their losses through, for example, direct payments, wage insurance, job retraining, or other supports. It is further assumed that such compensation will boost support for liberal trade policy. This article argues, however, that compensation is conceptually and practically limited in its ability to in fact make trade’s losers whole and is a poor tool to build support for free trade and address the plight of trade’s losers. Instead, it is suggested that broadly targeted non-trade specific programs are preferable, as well as perhaps a reconsideration of the purpose of safeguard measures such that they may be explicitly applied in order to mitigate political opposition to trade rather than only when industries are under threat.
Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jiel/jgab041 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jieclw:v:24:y:2021:i:4:p:683-702.
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of International Economic Law is currently edited by Kathleen Claussen, Sergio Puig and Michael Waibel
More articles in Journal of International Economic Law from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().