Corporate Securities Fraud: Insights from a New Empirical Framework

Tracy Yue Wang

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2013, vol. 29, issue 3, 535-568

Abstract: Empirical analysis of corporate fraud faces a challenge because the commission of fraud is not directly observable. We observe only detected frauds. In this article, I introduce a new empirical model to address this partial observability of fraud. The new model generates new insights about not only the determinants of fraud commission and fraud detection but also the interaction between the two latent processes. I also show that the empirical models used in the existing literature can lead to incorrect assessment of corporate or public policies designed to combat fraud. (JEL G30, G34, K22) The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2013
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