The Value of Confidential Policy Information: Persuasion, Transparency, and Influence

Clement Minaudier

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2022, vol. 38, issue 2, 570-612

Abstract: Transparency of the lobbying process is hailed as an effective means to limit the influence of special interest groups, but should transparency also apply to the information obtained by policy makers (PMs)? This article extends theories of informational lobbying by explicitly modeling the choice of PMs to obtain information before interacting with lobbyists. This approach reveals a new channel for the value of confidentiality: extracting evidence from special interest groups. It shows that, counter-intuitively, the influence of special interest groups can increase as PMs become more expert. These results shed light on the relationship between confidentiality, good governance, and influence.

JEL-codes: D72 D73 D78 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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