Maxmin Expected Utility and Weight of Evidence

David Kelsey

Oxford Economic Papers, 1994, vol. 46, issue 3, 425-44

Abstract: In 1989, I. Gilboa and D. Schmeidler proposed an extension of subjective expected utility theory called maxmin expected utility. The author presents a new exposition of this theory and suggests an extension of maxmin expected utility that which does not allow strictly dominated alternatives to be chosen. Maxmin expected utility is related to the earlier notion of weight of evidence and an application to welfare economics is discussed. The author examines normative properties of maxmin expected utility and argues that the theory is not vulnerable to the Dutch book argument. Copyright 1994 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1994
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Working Paper: Maxmin Expected Utility and Weight of Evidence (1990)
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