The Swedish Banking Crisis: Roots and Consequences

Peter Englund

Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 1999, vol. 15, issue 3, 80-97

Abstract: The article analyses the Swedish banking crisis in the early 1990s. Newly deregulated credit markets after 1985 stimulated a competitive process between financial institutions where expansion was given priority. Combined with an expansive macro policy, this contributed to an asset price boom. The subsequent crisis resulted from a highly leveraged private sector being simultaneously hit by three major exogenous events: a shift in monetary policy with an increase in pre-tax interest rates, a tax reform that increased after tax interest rates, and the ERM crisis. Combined with some overinvestment in commercial property, high real interest rates contributed to breaking the boom in real estate prices and triggering a downward price spiral resulting in bankruptcies and massive credit losses. The government rescued the banking system by issuing a general guarantee of bank obligations. The total direct cost to the taxpayer of the salvage has been estimated at around 2 per cent of GDP. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:oxford:v:15:y:1999:i:3:p:80-97

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