Informal Federalism: Self-Governance and Power Sharing in Afghanistan

Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2014, vol. 44, issue 2, 324-343

Abstract: Although the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan establishes a highly centralized political system, this article suggests Afghanistan is an informal federation in which customary organizations comprise a legitimate level of government capable of providing many public goods and services at the village level. Despite the absence of formal village government, governance in practice involves extensive power sharing between district government officials and customary representatives appointed by villagers themselves. The effectiveness of such self-governing customary arrangements is anticipated by the work of Elinor Ostrom, while the finding that day-to-day relations between levels of government are based in local norms rather than parchment institutions of the state demonstrate the continued insight of Vincent Ostrom into intergovernmental relations.

Date: 2014
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