Private Equity and the Resolution of Financial Distress

Does industry-wide distress affect defaulted firms?

Edith S Hotchkiss, David C Smith and Per Strömberg

The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 2021, vol. 10, issue 4, 694-747

Abstract: We examine the role private equity (PE) sponsors play in the resolution of financial distress of portfolio companies. PE-backed firms have higher leverage and default at higher rates than other companies borrowing in leveraged loan markets. But, PE-backed firms restructure more quickly, avoid bankruptcy court more often, and liquidate less often compared to other highly leveraged firms experiencing financial distress. PE owners are also more likely to retain control post-restructuring, often by infusing capital as firms approach distress. While default frequencies are higher among PE-backed firms, PE investors appear to manage financial distress at lower cost compared to other owners. (JEL G23, G32, G33)

Date: 2021
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