Bonded to the State: A Network Perspective on China's Corporate Debt Market

Li-Wen Lin and Curtis J. Milhaupt

Journal of Financial Regulation, 2017, vol. 3, issue 1, 1-39

Abstract: A corporate bond market has the potential to play an important role as a supplement to bank-oriented financial systems in emerging markets—functioning in effect as a ‘spare tire’. Yet bond markets typically rely upon formal institutions that are lacking in developing economies. Despite significant institutional weaknesses, China’s corporate bond market has grown to become the third largest in the world. In this article, we use a network perspective to explore the formation, operation, and function of the Chinese corporate bond market. We explain the market’s exponential growth as a result of a network of relationships among state-owned or linked actors that has substituted for formal institutions. But the consequences of this state-centric network may undermine the spare tire function. We begin by unpacking the complexities of the market’s structure and formal regulation, which have been shaped by a surprising degree of regulatory competition. Next, we analyse China’s corporate bond market as a network of relationships that invariably lead back to the state, and explore the consequences of this network on the pricing, rating, and default of corporate bonds. The paper concludes by highlighting several important policy issues raised by our analysis, including the consequences of regulatory competition, the potential role of the bankruptcy system in handling issuer financial distress, and the linkages between the corporate bond market and China’s rapidly expanding shadow banking system. The size, and institutional fragility, of the Chinese corporate bond market illustrate both the accomplishments and limitations of state capitalism.

Keywords: China; corporate bond market; debt markets; shadow banking; state capitalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:refreg:v:3:y:2017:i:1:p:1-39.

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